CAPÍTULO 1: 1983-84

1. ***NOTÍCIA ENVIADA PARA A TDM MACAU PROVENIENTE DO EAST TIMOR NEWS PRIMAVERA 1983***

Massacre in Viqueque

The church source reports a massacre by Indonesian troops in the Viqueke area, south east of Ailu. After guerrillas in an Indonesian concentration camp in the Viqueke region, seized weapons and reportedly killed 15 Indonesian troops and wounded 20 others. In retaliation, Indonesian troops massacred around 200 Timorese living in a village. This occurred some time between August 9, the date of the Fretilin revolt and September 1, the date the report was received.

[illegible] the diplomats of how fierce their last onslaught was and to light [illegible] the other reports of great cruelty particularly when hit by [illegible] Fretilin forces since the recapture last March.

The new invading forces [illegible] Konfrontasi which began [illegible] Province of Timor, against the Lord Linggarjati with the August 9 revolt in the Viqueke region being the largest revolt.

Jakarta has ensured that Timor once more rightly [illegible] the outside world for the new genocidal offensive. Flights organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross to take [illegible] have been told that almost [illegible] many Timorese have been killed since the beginning of the offensive.

The Indonesian government hopes behind this curtain of silence to keep knowledge of their new act of genocide from the outside world. But they will find out sure that the truth will not out.

The Australian government and other governments around the world which claim some sympathy for the sufferings of the East Timorese people have no excuse for silence.

The statement of "concern" issued last August by Mayhew [illegible]

[illegible] of the difficult [illegible] troops encountered [illegible] by Fretilin and Falantil and Haydon's attempts to [illegible] with Indonesian propaganda to blame Fretilin for "breaking the ceasefire" in the August 9 attacks.

It is in the hands of the Australian people and other governments allied to Jakarta to stop this offensive and save tens of thousands of lives. Their silence will only embolden them more.

WE PUBLISH BELOW AN EARLIER ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION, BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEW OFFENSIVE WAS CONFIRMED.

Why Murdani and Suharto launched Op. Persatuan

It is eight years since the first Indonesian troops poured into East Timor. In the past eight years, between 100,000 and 200,000 East Timorese have died. Over 70,000 Indonesian troops have also died in Suharto's attempt to conquer the Maubere people.

After a heavy blow in 1978-1979, the Fretilin resistance has reorganised and is now in a position where the Jakarta generals must seek once more to try to destroy the resistance of the Maubere people by yet another genocidal campaign.

The new strongman in Jakarta, General Benny Murdani, was quoted in the Jakarta daily Sinar Harapan of August 16 as saying that if Fretilin did not surrender the Indonesian armed forces will use "all their arsenal" to wipe them out.

Murdani's threat confirms earlier warnings sent to Xa Na Na Guzmao, the commander in chief of Falantil inside East Timor. Xa Na Na in a letter received early August in Lisbon said that Murdani had written to him on June 25 threatening an Indonesian operasi Persatuan (Operation Unity) on August 17, Indonesian Independence Day, to wipe out Fretilin unless they surrendered. Xa Na Na also said that in July he had received a letter from Col. Dermawan, the Indonesian Supreme Commander in East Timor, which acknowledged that Indonesian forces in East Timor today did not want to fight, but that he could bring in 60 battalions (or 50,000 to 60,000 troops) from elsewhere in Indonesia who would.

Murdani's ultimatum coincided with Sinar Harapan's [illegible] to cease to [illegible] and other governments looking [illegible] to see they "did not know" about the impending offensive. They have no excuse to not intervene and try to stop this offensive before it begins or before it smashes its genocidal conclusion.

This offensive like the attacks which have preceded it will almost all result in another huge death toll among the civilian population in the mountains who are still outside Indonesian control.

The horrifying picture painted in the October 1982 message of Xa Na Na to the United Nations General Assembly of previous offensives will no doubt be repeated. Xa Na Na's October 1982 message is reprinted elsewhere in this issue of East Timor News.

The Jakarta generals are in the process of breaking the ceasefire agreed to at a meeting between Xa Na Na and [illegible], Dermawan at last [illegible] in Fretilin-controlled territory on March 23, 1984. This ceasefire was preceded by earlier local ones which occurred at the request of local Indonesian commanders and troops who were sick of the war in East Timor.

All the evidence points to the Indonesian troops in East Timor now being unwilling to kill and to killed to fulfill Gen. Suharto's ambitions in East Timor.

Moreover, latest reports indicate that Suharto's attempts to "Timorise" the war have also failed. At least one of the two Timorese battalions, 744, has been disbanded by the Indonesians because it was suspected of being thoroughly infiltrated by Fretilin. The so-called local defence militias are similarly highly suspected by the Indonesians of being infiltrated. The crisis in "Timorise" the war has failed while Indonesian troops [illegible]

joint in the struggle.

The whole world was also able to witness to that fact. Because of the strength of the Fretilin underground, the color photos were smuggled out of the liberated areas showing the ceasefire talks and life in the liberated areas as well as Indonesian will of the Indonesian people or of the Indonesian officers and soldiers who were ordered to fight in Timor. It was manufactured by a small clique of powerful generals in Jakarta and their masters in Washington, Canberra and other rich capitals.

Pursuit in 1974 differed from the current situation in Indonesia, but Menzies and Suharto should not believe will not destroy the resistance of the East Timorese people, even though it will and thousands of more lives in the years that Suharto has already stolen up to [illegible].

—ETAN collective.

Fretilin visit to Australia, Pacific a big success

The visit of Fretilin Central Committee members Abilio Araujo and Roque Rodrigues to Australia from July 17 to August 4 was an outstanding success.

After being banned from Australia by the former government since November 1975, they were able to put their views to millions of Australians through public meetings and media interviews.

Vanuatu conference

The two Fretilin representatives stopped over in Sydney on July 8 and 10 on their way to the international conference on an independent and nuclear-free Pacific, held in Vila, Vanuatu. There they received a warm reception from the delegates from Pacific and some European nations present. In particular, they received a very warm reception from the government of Vanuatu which has courageously supported East Timor since independence. They also met delegates from south Pacific nations who were able to learn first-hand the new situation in East Timor.

In Sydney, the Fretilin representatives addressed a well-attended public meeting on July 24 and held many press, TV and radio interviews. They met with union, church and aid organisations and touched with the Acting Premier of New South Wales, Jack Ferguson, at the NSW parliament house.

Abilio Araujo went to Melbourne and held a successful public meeting attended by about 100 people and addressed by the newly-formed East Timor Support Group. He had many media interviews and spoke in Melbourne at the same time as the Labor Party conference.

Roque Rodrigues at the same time went to the steel city of Wollongong, south of Sydney, and attended a public meeting of about 50 people. One of the biggest held for an overseas speaker in that city for some time. He also received widespread media attention and met with miners and the South Coast Labor Council.

Meet ALP MPs

On July 25 the two Fretilin representatives went to the national capital, Canberra where they met the Labor Party parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. This meeting was attended by four ministers from Hawke's cabinet, including Bill Hayden, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and senior members of the ALP, including ministers engaged in cabinet sub-committees and in the Labor caucus.

The warm welcome accorded by this ALP committee received wide media coverage nationally.

Over 150 people attended a public meeting and reception for the Fretilin representatives, a good attendance for Canberra.

1,500 in Melbourne

It was in Melbourne however that the Fretilin representatives received their biggest welcome. Some 1,500 people packed the public meeting on July 31 at the Fitzroy Town Hall. The ALP Victorian President, George Crawford, made a very strong statement in support of the implementation of ALP policy on East Timor. As in other cities, the Fretilin representatives faced an extensive round of meetings with ALP, General Unions, Union and civil organisations. It should be noted that the Deputy Leader of the Australian Democrats, Senator Colin Mason also spoke at the public meeting in Melbourne, strongly condemning the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and asserting the support of Indonesian opposition to Suharto's expansionism to Timor. Other parties held the balance of power in the Senate.

Abilio Araujo then went on [illegible]

Roque Rodrigues ended his Australian tour to return to Europe via the South Pacific where he visited leaders in the Solomons Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Fiji.

In Australia, Abilio Araujo spoke at a public meeting of about 150 people and met with ALP unions and church groups, as well as many MPs.

Perth visit

Abilio Araujo then continued to Perth for the second leg of his tour. He spoke to a crowd of 150 people there and met many ALP, union, church and other groups.

The reports their tours the Fretilin representatives also held self-arranged meetings with the Timorese community in most centres where they went, particularly in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. In many ways, the enthusiastic and widespread participation of Timorese living in Australia in the public meetings and the separate Fretilin- and Falintil-type meetings held during the tour was one of the most [illegible]

-- continued page 10

2. MAIO 1984: AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE A AUSTRÁLIA E A INDONÉSIA, A AJUDA MILITAR E A MANUTENÇÃO DE SUHARTO NO PODER [1]

A ajuda militar é o mais potente símbolo de apoio às ações do governo que a recebe. A atual reação interna australiana à ocupação de Timor-Leste e às ameaças indonésias de rejeição do auxílio militar australiano, vai manter na ribalta o governo de Camberra pelo seu continuado desejo de apoiar a Indonésia. Apesar da política do Partido Trabalhista australiano afirmar que o apoio militar deve ser suspenso até que se verifique a retirada das tropas Indonésias estacionadas em Timor, o governo de Bob Hawke manteve o programa de cooperação e defesa ["Defence Cooperation Program".]

Este programa de 10.3 milhões de dólares em 1983/84 elevará a contribuição militar australiana à Indonésia aos 75 milhões de dólares desde 1975. A ajuda militar à Indonésia será um dos pontos altos do debate sobre a política trabalhista em relação a Timor-Leste na próxima Conferência Nacional dos trabalhistas em julho 1984, embora outros assuntos possam também vir a lume.

O Comité Permanente do Senado (Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence) para Negócios Estrangeiros e Defesa iniciou um inquérito sobre aquele programa de cooperação e defesa, existindo sinais de que Jacarta poderá abandonar aquele programa em virtude das críticas feitas no seu âmbito em relação a Timor-Leste. Vejamos em resumo em que consiste a ajuda militar à Indonésia, por quê ela existe e para que serve.

2.1. SEGURANÇA PARA QUEM?

Durante 1975, o Ministério de Defesa Australiano tentou sem qualquer resultado convencer o governo trabalhista de Gough Whitlam a aceitar a ideia dum Timor-Leste independente. Em outubro de 1975 um memorando interno só viria a ser revelado no livro agora banido de Walsh e Munster. Documentos sobre a política de Defesa e dos Negócios Estrangeiros mostram qual o raciocínio seguido em relação à Indonésia. O então 1º Secretário Adjunto, W. B. Pritchett escrevia ao então Ministro da Defesa, Bill Morrison dizendo:

> *"Para além da PNG, a Indonésia é o único território através do qual e do qual pode ocorrer ou ser iniciado com facilidade um ataque não nuclear contra a Austrália. Comando das bases indonésias seria provavelmente essencial para qualquer ataque que não fosse puramente marítimo… "*
>
> *"À data, a Indonésia é o país mais favorecido para poder atacar a Austrália, sendo já capaz de criar situações de assédio militar de nível médio ou baixo mas as quais criariam problemas de defesa difíceis. À medida que as suas capacidades aumentam com o decorrer dos anos aumenta a sua capacidade de criar formas de ataque mais substanciais. Um ataque da Indonésia à Austrália não envolveria necessariamente alterações na ordem política estratégica global dada a sua gravidade crítica para os EU (se a compararmos às alterações necessárias para um ataque do Japão, por exemplo.)*
>
> *"A possibilidade de os EUA se envolverem e apoiarem a Austrália são assim mais incertas em especial se se tratar de níveis baixos de ameaças excluindo um assalto frontal. Esta e outras considerações paralelas têm maior relevância nas relações bilaterais do que considerações tais como comércio ou investimento."*

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[1] *MAIO 1984, INSIDE INDONESIA. JOHN WADDINGHAM. (TRADUZIDO E ADAPTADO POR JCC PARA TDM E LUSA)*

De facto, as relações entre os dois países - em áreas que não a política e estratégica - são ainda embrionárias e não se espera grande desenvolvimento imediato. A ser assim, então porquê a ajuda militar à Indonésia? O Ministério da Defesa tinha uma visão sobre a potencial ameaça e a qual é aqui referida por Pritchett:

> *"As avaliações ao longo dos anos vieram a mostrar ser improvável uma ameaça militar Indonésia sendo esta ainda a opinião atual. Esta baseia-se na premissa de uma continuada existência de relações bilaterais amigáveis e cooperantes tais como as que se têm verificado durante a maior parte dos anos desde a fundação da República Indonésia.*
> *"Uma Indonésia segura, unida e bem-disposta" escrevia Pritchett, "é um desiderato básico e duradouro para a nossa estratégia política".*

O Ministério da Defesa acreditava em 1975 que uma invasão indonésia de Timor poderia criar reações internas na Austrália que "pudessem tornar difícil de manter a política de cooperação com a Indonésia". O Ministério temia em especial que houvesse apelos da direita e da esquerda do quadrante político australiano para a terminação do programa de Defesa e Cooperação.

Pode-se concluir que, pelo menos, a ajuda militar australiana se destinava a manter a Indonésia bem-disposta em relação à Austrália ajudando o atual governo indonésio na sua manutenção de segurança e a preservar a "Unidade Indonésia". Contudo, de acordo com o [já falecido] jornalista do Sydney Morning Herald, Peter Hastings, a principal vantagem para a Austrália era a do programa proporcionar ao pessoal da Defesa acesso ao pensamento estratégico indonésio em relação ao assunto regionais e mundiais.

Poder-se-ia acrescentar que os mapas militares de locais tais como West Irian [Papua Ocidental], preparados pelo Programa, poderiam ter alguma utilidade futura para os militares australianos. A linha de pensamento de Hastings é uma forma educada de indicar que o programa permite aos australianos manterem-se informados sobre o que os indonésios fazem.

Embora isto seja um cenário credível, é utilizado para contrapor argumentos ao fim do apoio militar australiano à Indonésia. Possivelmente, o Programa também dá uma boa visão aos indonésios sobre o "pensamento estratégico" australiano.

2.2. EM QUE CONSISTE ESTE APOIO?

O apoio militar australiano à Indonésia tem três componentes:

Equipamento: *os principais artigos de equipamento desde 1972 incluíam aviões a jato Avon Sabre, aviões Dakota, helicópteros Sioux, aviões de vigilância Nomad, e barcos de patrulha Carpentária e Attack Class, barcos de patrulha fluvial, radioequipamento de campo e Land Rovers.*
Serviços: *Incluem projetos cartográficos em Sumatra, West Irian [Papua Ocidental], Kalimantan (no Bornéu), Molucas e ilhas costeiras de Sumatra assim como manutenção e formação.*
Formação: *Mais de 1200 militares indonésios foram treinados na Austrália em vários ramos do exército, marinha e força aérea.*

a 2ª Grande Guerra, enquanto outros focam a sua preocupação genuína pela autodeterminação, bem-estar e direitos do povo timorense. A maioria dos grupos de apoio a Timor-Leste está motivada por este sentimento.

2.6. EXPLORAÇÃO AUSTRALIANA DA INDONÉSIA.

Há quem tenda a propagar o ponto de vista que a Indonésia é uma ameaça para a Austrália, que esta tem sido maltratada ou que é vítima da diplomacia indonésia. Será mais verdade porém, que é a Austrália quem está a explorar e a oprimir a Indonésia. São as companhias australianas que pedem e beneficiam da intervenção militar indonésia com equipamento da Austrália e dos EUA nas disputas de ordem industrial, beneficiando de recursos naturais imensos e mão de obra barata em Irian Jaya.

A Austrália é um membro do Grupo Intergovernamental da Indonésia (IGGI) ao qual a Indonésia deve biliões de dólares e que aprova novas ajudas com base na avaliação do desempenho do regime de Suharto.

Quando os governos australianos dão o seu apoio e ajuda à Indonésia estão a ajudar um governo que já provou ser um fiel servo dos interesses ocidentais, reprimindo contestação laboral para facilitar uma mão de obra barata, proporcionando paraísos fiscais e acesso aos recursos naturais com um mínimo de supervisão, desta forma obtendo contrapartidas ocidentais de mais de 20 biliões de dólares.

Como podemos então esperar que o governo australiano apoie os timorenses se eles estão a combater um país que o ocidente vê como um fiel aliado?

Como podemos esperar que o governo australiano se manifeste contra a repressão da oposição e da resistência na Indonésia ou em Irian Jaya, se tal ameaça é dirigida a um fiel servo dos seus interesses? Trata-se duma raiva mal direcionada quando se lida com a falta de coragem das respostas oficiais australianas a Jacarta pois que se trata duma cumplicidade australiana na opressão e exploração dos interesses do povo indonésio.

É verdade que personagens do regime de Suharto ocasionalmente criticam a Austrália chamando-lhe imatura ou irracionalmente anti-indonésia, mas eles tentam simplesmente embaraçar o governo australiano.

Toda esta retórica jamais pode fazer esquecer o facto daquele mesmo regime estar a colaborar à custa do seu próprio povo com interesses económicos estrangeiros, incluindo a Austrália. Assim, torna-se importante que nós australianos não nos tornemos chauvinistas. Os sentimentos nacionalistas não devem engodar os australianos a serem aparentemente humilhados por um país do "Terceiro Mundo" em vez de se preocuparem com a verdadeira opressão e pobreza dos povos da Indonésia, Irian Jaya e Timor-Leste.

A nossa relação com o povo indonésio tem de ser inspirada numa compreensão de que as elites australianas e seus aliados são responsáveis por essa pobreza e falta de liberdade. Temos de entender que não obstante a retórica o regime de Suharto deve a sua existência, amealha fortunas e exercita o seu poder como um fiel servo dos interesses do Ocidente. Quando invade Timor-Leste, brutalmente oprime os povos Papuas e assedia pacatos aldeãos dentro do território do país independente da Papua Nova-Guiné não está só a proteger o seu poder mas também a servir os interesses das nossas elites.

Não podemos esperar de nenhum governo australiano, por mais progressista que seja quando na oposição, que assuma uma posição mais crítica, e isto, não porque lhes falte a coragem, mas porque sabem que tal não é nos interesses das elites australianas. Isto quer dizer, que as campanhas sobre os direitos humanos na Indonésia e em Irian Jaya, e a autodeterminação de Timor-Leste devem prosseguir baseadas no reconhecimento de que as nossas elites são parcialmente responsáveis pelos infortúnios daquelas sociedades.

2. *MAIO 1984 TRADUZIDO E ENVIADO PARA A TDM, INSIDE INDONÉSIA MAIO 1984 JOHN WADDINGHAM*

3. BISPO DE DÍLI CONDENA FRETILIN[2]

Sidney, 30/7/84, TDM) - O administrador apostólico de Díli, Mons. Ximenes Belo, salesiano, nomeado em maio último para substituir o vocalmente crítico bispo D. Martinho da Costa Lopes, condenou veementemente os métodos praticados pela Fretilin e pelas forças de ocupação Indonésia sobre a população civil, mas declarou não considerar como comunistas os guerrilheiros da Fretilin, que apenas combatem pela autodeterminação do território. Citando a contribuição que semestralmente envia para apoio dos seus colegas de Timor, a informação que nos foi prestada por Pat Walsh, do comité australiano para auxílio económico ao estrangeiro (ACFOA) é deveras surpreendente pois jamais o padroado de Timor recebeu os 15 biliões de rupias que anualmente lhe são enviados (1 304 348 contos).

4. BISPO DE DÍLI APELA À AUSTRÁLIA[3]

Sidney 1/8/84, TDM) O administrador apostólico de Díli, Mons. Belo apelou ontem para a Austrália tentar convencer a Indonésia a iniciar conversações com a Fretilin evitando assim mais derrame de sangue entre o povo maubere. Citando uma vez mais as prisões, os abusos de poder e as torturas arbitrárias, a que o povo de Timor está sujeito, Mons. Belo apelou para a criação de uma missão de estudo internacional com poderes para investigar as alegadas violações de direitos, mesmo que tal missão encontre as dificuldades e acusações habituais de interferência nos assuntos internos da Indonésia. Citando casos recentes de execuções sumárias de membros da resistência, Mons. Belo referiria ainda casos de violações de direitos humanos, abusos de autoridade perpetrados pelas autoridades Indonésias, as quais se bem que tendo embarcado numa campanha maciça de construção de estradas, escolas, e pontes apenas o faziam para proveito dos seus próprios fins e não para bem da comunidade maubere.
Focando que todos vivem sob opressão, Mons. Belo garantiu o desejo autêntico de obter pelo menos mais autonomia.
Ainda de acordo com as suas declarações, a Fretilin estava a perder apoio popular, fruto da sua campanha de intimidação sobre a população civil, que se fazia sentir sobretudo nas zonas de Ainaro, Baucau, Viqueque e Lospalos, restando-lhes apenas a preparação militar dos mais jovens.
Fontes militares alegam existirem cerca de 10 mil tropas regulares Indonésias para os cerca de 500 resistentes da Fretilin ainda ativamente operacionais. Desde o passado mês que uma intensificação das ações militares na capital, Díli, pressupõe o início de uma nova campanha antiguerrilhas. Lembremos a propósito que Mons. Belo havia já anteriormente pedido autorização às forças indonésias para tentar entabular diálogo com o comité central da Fretilin, no sentido de tentar obter acordo para a efetivação de conversações bilaterais, para a consecução de um cessar-fogo, a qual porém lhe foi negada. O MNE australiano Bill Hayden recusou-se a comentar sobre este pedido.
Entretanto foram dados a conhecer excertos das cartas enviadas pelo novo administrador apostólico de Díli, ao seu predecessor em Lisboa, e nas quais se faz eco da política continuada de julgamentos, torturas e abusos dos militares sobre os civis. Tais excertos serviram também de base a uma petição subscrita por 123 congressistas norte-americanos que fizeram incluir a discussão do assunto nas recentes conversações na ONU. Mons. Belo escreve considerando indispensável para a obtenção da paz que sejam dadas oportunidades aos Timorenses de ocuparem cargos na administração civil, indústria e comércio, criticando ainda aqueles indonésios que originários de Java, Sumatra e Celebes que ocupam tais posições, os quais graças à sua religião muçulmana tentam apenas destruir o cristianismo e as religiões anímicas do povo maubere, construindo mesquitas num zelo fanático de promoção islâmica. A terminar as suas declarações, numa conferência de bispos católicos realizada em Jacarta, Mons. Belo afirmou-se pronto a proclamar bem alto a realidade da vida em Timor mesmo que isso implicasse a sua deposição.

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[2] *DESPACHO 10/84 TDM 1/8/84*
[3] *DESPACHO 11/84ª TDM 1/8/84*

5. INSIDE INDONESIA OUTUBRO 1984 TRADUZIDO E ENVIADO PARA A TDM

Labor's new East Timor policy

Adopted at the ALP National Conference, July 1984

'The ALP expresses its continuing concern at the situation in East Timor, particularly its officially stated objection to the fact that the former Portuguese colony was incorporated without the East Timorese people having been given an adequate opportunity to express their own wishes through an internationally supervised act of self-determination.

'The ALP indicates grave concern at reports of renewed fighting in East Timor and about the threats to human life and safety there, and calls on the Indonesian government to give free access to humanitarian relief teams, to international organisations such as Red Cross, Amnesty and the Commission of Jurists, and to allow an independent mission to enter the territory to make an independent and impartial report on conditions.

'Accordingly, the ALP calls on the Australian Government to give active support to international initiatives, that have the aim of achieving a settlement of the Timor problem. Specifically, the Government should support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General to bring about a solution.

'The ALP recognises the vital importance of developing a closer, more understanding, realistic and productive relationship between Australia and Indonesia, based on a more sensitive and better appreciation of the shared aspirations, as well as the historical, political and cultural differences between the two countries.

'The ALP expresses its concern at the state of the relationship between Australia and Indonesia, which it acknowledges is not a condition appropriate to two neighbouring states, with many shared interests and international commitments of fundamental importance to regional security and social and economic progress.

'The ALP calls for the broadening of cultural, political and economic ties between the two countries, and for the opening of the widest possible dialogue between appropriate interest groups in the Australian and Indonesian communities on questions on which there are differences, as well as on shared concerns in relation to regional and global issues.

'The ALP supports the aim of advancing Indonesia's overall social economic development as rapidly as possible, in particular the urgent need to improve the living conditions of the general population.'

fighting in East Timor and the re-location as a result of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ALP will support efforts of the UN Secretary-General to bring about a ceasefire and to bring all parties to the conflict to the negotiating table to ensure that the right of self-determination is guaranteed to the people of East Timor".

The Jones compromise

The Timor debate was scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, 11 July, three days into the Conference. On the Tuesday evening a significant shift occurred when the Party's three-quarters majority dissolved. A compromise formulation, now Barry Jones' name, was circulated — the product of a hurried meeting between Hayden and Jones, it is understood, in an unexpected quarter. Hayden's Cabinet colleague, Minister for Science and Technology Barry Jones, had been in the chair at the Party's mini-policy committee meeting on Tuesday afternoon which had considered the Timor issue. He proposed that the Party's new policy be framed in the style of a motherhood statement, a show of hands being called for (although the Socialist Left delegates, Bob Hogg, intervened to say that a significant number of delegates had abstained).

The Jones formulation went considerably further than Hayden wanted to. It highlighted Timor, relegating the paragraphs on Australia-Indonesia relations to the end. More importantly, it put more emphasis on human rights and said Australia should get involved in the international search for a settlement. A proposition contained in Timor's earlier submissions but specifically ruled-out by Hayden both in his draft and his talks with Suharto on 4 June, Jones was later to confide that Hayden had been bluntly informed that unless he agreed to a strengthening of the policy he would be rolled. Such was the feeling within the Party, Jones himself, it should be noted, had also been under considerable pressure by his own faction, the Victorian Independents. Hayden accepted the new formulation 'with reservations' and withdrew his draft. But he categorically refused to accept any recognition of East Timor's continuing right to self-determination as called for in Timor's submission and, by and large, the majority went along with him on this.

The Left amendments

It was on this point that the Socialist Left and the Timor lobby dug in their heels. 'Self-determination was the only acceptable base for a workable and just settlement. A new amendment was put forward over from Hayden's name which caught virtually paragraph 7 of the Jones resolution to follow (see italicised words):

"Accordingly, the ALP calls on the Australian Government to give active support to international initiatives that have the aim of achieving a just settlement of the Timor problem *in accordance with internationally recognised principles*. Specifically, the government should support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General to bring about a *ceasefire and to bring all parties to the conflict to the negotiating table to ensure that the right of self-determination is guaranteed to the people of East Timor*."

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It was defeated 53 votes to 33. Only one non-Socialist Left member supported the amendment — Ken Wriedt, the leader of the Tasmanian ALP.

A second Socialist Left amendment was moved by Bill Hartley and Joe Camilleri[1] arguing that paragraph 7 of the Jones resolution wrongly implied recognition that East Timor was now a province of Indonesia. Hartley sought to replace the word 'incorporation' with the clause 'subject of an illegal and unrecognisable act purporting to incorporate it as a province of Indonesia'. It was lost on the voices.

In the course of the speech, Hartley reminded the Foreign Minister to inform the Conference whether or not Australia recognised East Timor as part of Indonesia. Hayden did not reply.

Space does not permit an analysis of the speeches delivered during the debate. Suffice it to say there were, by and large, set pieces presented to justify positions already taken, not because it was believed they would persuade delegates to change their minds. A general tone of Timorese surprise at a personal appearance by Mochtar would not have made any difference at this time. The Murdani installation in Positive Perspective[2] as the man who would be Australia's next Ambassador to Indonesia, Bill Morrison told Jaljaal that "tens of thousands of lives" were lost during the 1975 civil war that Fretilin started this way, and that today Fretilin represents only 1% of the people of East Timor".[3]

The new policy

The new ALP policy has two disturbing and fundamental shortcomings. First, it does not seek to involve the Timorese in the search for a settlement. A bilateral approach resistant to Indonesia and Portugal, and approved by the UN, would therefore be technically consistent with policy. This would get Indonesia off the international hook on which it has spluttered for so long. But it is quite doubtful that it would bring peace to the East Timorese people any more than a similar deal has meant peace in West New Guinea[4], the policy fails to address the question of the domain's sovereignty. While this could indeed prevent us from wishing to receive judgment on the matter, it also leaves the Hawke Government free to extend *de jure* recognition by stealth by deed — without technically contravening official policy.

On the other hand, the pain changes given the Timor movement plenty to go on with. Three positive points can be made about the Party's new position. One, the ALP does not consider East Timor to be a closed book. The Party clearly feels the situation is intolerable and requires a solution. Two, the Party believes the international community, including the UN and Australia, have a duty to work for a solution. Three, the ALP believes that NGOs, not just governments, have an important role to play, particularly in the area of human rights and welfare. And four, the ALP reserves its right to intervene on a question of substance like East Timor even where much importance is placed on good relations with the offending country.

The Conference gave Bill Hayden some of the freedom to move he has so often insisted on. How he uses that freedom and who benefits most in the last analysis will be matters of the policy, the path and wisdom of the ALP. ●

1. These paragraphs on the last four sentences of the Jones policy are based on a paragraph on a confidential memo in Inside Indonesia. It calls for a less biased and more balanced Parliament relationship to unfold. [ed.]
2. According to the International Red Cross and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, both of which visited East Timor immediately after the civil war, more than — [illegible] — people were evacuated until an estimated 8,000 — or 1% — remained. [ed.]
3. It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate Fretilin's control in any area, making precise support to this [illegible] the support of only 1% of the population. The estimation that the other 99% support Fretilin is obviously ludicrous.

Kicking the Aussie can

Australia in the Indonesian press

By a Special Correspondent

Australian news media are often criticised for biased or negative reporting on Indonesia. Here Indonesian press coverage is put under the microscope.

In the interest of defending the Indonesian government's view of the East Timor and West Irian questions, Indonesia's middle class newspaper-reading public has been exposed to widespread and sustained allegations of neo-Indonesian brutality in the Australian media — and in public and academic opinion. This has emerged in the Indonesian press treatment of Ashton on East Timor leading up to the Australian Labor Party's National Conference in July 1984.

During the weeks preceding the conference, major newspapers in Indonesia devoted considerable reporting and commentary space to Australian interest in the East Timor issue, and the related question of relations with Indonesia. Taken as a whole, these news items indicate both the extent to which the recent history of East Timor and West Irian has been re-written in Indonesia. They also reflect concern by Indonesian public opinion makers that Australia might give a boost to the dissemination of viewpoints contrary to the version of events now enshrined for consumption by the Indonesian public.

Official views parroted

Officially, Indonesia sees itself as taking part, in East Timor and West Irian, in the final stages of a process of decolonisation of the archipelago. By abandoning, along with its people of these territories, the burden of their isolated development.

Sinar Harapan, one of Jakarta's more respected dailies, advised its readership to impress on the parliamentarians of the Australian public that this process of decolonisation can be reversed or misplaced. (*Sinar Harapan*, 23 June 1984) The 'process of decolonisation' through integration with Indonesia was presented in the military-owned daily *Angkatan Bersen-*

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jata as an act of the limits on the part of both peoples expressed in East Timor through the Indonesian-created People's Representative Council.

The people of East Timor, apparently deprived of the opportunity to join the Indonesian Republic in 1945 and having won independence a mere eight years ago after suffering with most Indonesian brethren to make up for the backwardness which a longer period of colonial oppression has placed on them. The media, if we are to believe the Indonesian press, are impressive. In the interests of perpetuating prosperity, priority has been given to agricultural development and building health and education. From a mere 20 primary schools under the Portuguese, East Timor's 632 villages can now boast 650 schools. Mastery of the Indonesian language has increased measuring stick for educational achievement, as well as a sign of awareness of nationalism and national unity in our youngest provinces (*Angkatan Bersenjata*). To mention through — of an almost year-long Indonesian story offensive began in late 1988 to persuade the Timorese of the wisdom of integration.

Concerned Australians, according to *Sinar Harapan*, might be surprised to learn that in especially the colonialist presence of Australia's aborigines with Indonesians as a comparison and a warning of its policy of transmigration from Java to West Irian. The fate of Australia's aborigines reminds Indonesia of the need to give the greatest possible attention to the interests, feelings and aspirations of the original inhabitants of areas planned for the settlement of transmigrants.

Democracy inimical to Australia-Indonesia relations?

In a somewhat cautionary tone, *Kompas* (21 June 1984) called on Australians to equip themselves with the necessary knowledge and sensitivity to understand the complex process of national integration which Indonesia faces. It regretted that whereas issues which threatened relations between Indonesia and Malaysia or Papua New Guinea could normally be settled amicably different ethical and political systems in Australia made such resolutions more difficult. The

Canberra attacked over Fretilin visa

These reports followed the extensive coverage given in the previous week to the Australian government's decision to grant a visa to Jose Ramos Horta, for a "six week anti-Indonesian propaganda campaign in Australia". (*Sinar Harapan*, 11 June 1984) In a derisive and derogatory editorial, the same journal (*Berita Yudha* applauded Horta's failure to win support from the ALP and the Hawke government. Describing Horta as "a roving troublemaker having a go in big cities around the world on the excuse of fighting for his integration group", *Berita Yudha* wondered why, with official objections from both Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden, Horta had even been granted a visa by Australia. (Horta's visit to Jakarta two years previously, and the warm hope of opening and support for the independence movement in East Timor which he received from the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik now belongs to the turmoil and rewritten history of the territory.) Apparent Australian generosity with regard to Horta's views also formed a part of a latter-

report by *Kompas* (20 June 1983) of the visit to Australia by OPM representative Henk Ijoko to address the ($50,000 or Rp. 30 million government-funded) world-wide conference of indigenous peoples in Canberra.

'Anti-Indonesian' studies in Australia

Less than one month after the press commences its recent leading up to the ALP conference, *Kompas* was once again hailing the first time with a front page generalised article on Australian interest in Indonesian affairs.

In a lengthy and pretentiously-titled feature article entitled 'Indonesian Studies in Australia — An Anti-Indonesian Picture', Subagio Sastrowardoyo was told that whatever contribution to Australian understanding of Indonesia's national struggle might be hoped for from the teaching about Indonesia in Australia, 'Indonesian Studies' was in fact a basis or framework for anti-Indonesian prejudice was spread throughout Australian society.

The author of this article was Subagio Sastrowardoyo, a poet and writer who in the ten years prior to 1981 taught Indonesian language and cultural studies at various institutions in Adelaide, South Australia.

In his report Subagio asserted that Australian teaching about Indonesia in Australia was based on foreign (not Indonesian-language) sources, that following the American model it concentrated itself with contemporary social and political developments rather than the classical literature and cultural base of Indonesian Studies in Europe; and because teachers of Indonesian in Australia were to the main impartial concerned scholars' who saw Indonesia from a superficial Marxist viewpoint, all students of Indonesia in Australia acquired a negative and biased view of Indonesia as a backward and politically unstable country. From this point of view it was only people from 'advanced' countries like Australia who could help the Indonesian nation to progress, or nothing the Indonesian government did to develop its country could ever suit its people.

Given the extent to which the main body of academic opinion in Australia serves as a bulwark in support of Indonesian government policies, the claims made by Subagio are extraordinary. Although it actually rests on a personal and subjective critique of individuals mentioned in the article, it is nevertheless presented as a complete characterisation of the nature and purpose of Indonesian Studies in Australia. That it could appear two weeks after the ALP conference, in what is Indonesia's most respected daily newspaper, indicates the extent to which the discrediting of Australia has become a necessary part of the workings of 'national security' in pursuit of Indonesia.

EDITOR'S NOTE

Since this article was written and typeset *Kompas* has published a number of responses to the Subagio Sastrowardoyo article. The responses included a letter from academics at Brisbane's Griffith University, three longer articles by staff members of Indonesian or Australian universities, and a column many by an academic at the University of Indonesia. The debate concluded with a reply by Subagio Sastrowardoyo on 11 September 1983.

While *Inside Indonesia* is glad that *Kompas* made space available to people wishing to comment on Subagio Sastrowardoyo's critique, it believes that the essence of the above article remains correct, warranting its publication. ●

REGRESSAR ÍNDICE
Capítulo seguinte